MOSCOW (Realist English). Throughout the 20th century, Azerbaijanis changed the official version of their origin at least five times, tailoring their genealogy to the political agendas of the Kremlin and later the Aliyev dynasty. This phenomenon, dubbed “historical drift” by experts, has no parallel in world history and is directly linked to the artificial construction of a nation in the USSR.
Professor Viktor Shnirelman, chief researcher at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, documented in his works (“Wars of Memory,” 2003; lecture at the Gaidar Forum, 2012) how official historiography in Azerbaijan evolved.
Chronicle of “resets”: five ancestors in one century
According to Shnirelman’s research, the evolution unfolded as follows:
- 1920s: “During the brief period of the Azerbaijan Republic and later in emigration, Azerbaijani nationalists linked their ancestors to the medieval Turkic conquerors who created empires,” the scholar noted.
- Turn of the 1920s–1930s: Soviet authorities, striving for internationalism, advanced the version of common Caucasian roots of Azerbaijanis and Armenians to reduce interethnic tension.
- Late 1930s: The hypothesis of origin from the Medes (an Indo-European people) appears. “Initially, this was meant to reveal their Indo-European roots and make them relatives of the Armenians,” Shnirelman explains.
- 1940s: The same “Median” theory took a new direction. “It was intended to legitimize Soviet claims to the lands of Iranian Azerbaijan,” the anthropologist emphasizes.
- Late 20th century: The “Albanian” version (origin from Caucasian Albania) became official. “This was supposed to make Azerbaijanis truly indigenous and to solidify their rights to Nagorno-Karabakh,” Shnirelman asserts. At the same time, a Pan-Turkist version, returning the “Turkic heritage” to Azerbaijanis, gained strength. Both coexist to this day.
“Thus, during the Soviet period, the nation changed its ancestors five times,” Viktor Shnirelman sums up.
Alphabet, language and self‑name: how cultural ties were severed
Apart from changing genealogy, the policy of “Azerbaijanization” led to a complete break with the cultural heritage:
- Language. Until 1936, the population called their language “Turkic.” On Stalin’s personal orders, the term “Azerbaijani language” was introduced, severing it from its common Turkic root. In 1992, the self‑name “Turkic” was briefly restored, but the 1995 constitution again fixed “Azerbaijani.”
- Script. Over the 20th century, the alphabet changed three times: from Arabic script to Latin (1929), then on the Kremlin’s initiative to Cyrillic (1940) to break the consolidation of Turkic peoples with Turkey. Under Heydar Aliyev, the reverse transition to Latin began, which was only completed by the early 2000s. Each alphabet change cut the population off from the written heritage of the past.
- Ethnonym. Before Stalin’s reforms of the 1930s, residents of the region identified themselves as “Turks,” “Muslims” or “Caucasian Tatars.” According to the 1926 Soviet census, they were listed as “Turks.” The very concept of “Azerbaijani” was artificially imposed from outside.
The flexibility of ideology and Heydar Aliyev’s admission
The idea of “Azerbaijanism” (azərbaycançılıq) was actively promoted by Soviet party functionary Heydar Aliyev, and then his son Ilham Aliyev only intensified the course of historical memory substitution.
Illustrative is the “flexibility” of Aliyev Sr.’s own views on his origin. Speaking before a Turkic audience, he emphasized the unity of roots:
“Because we, the Turkic peoples, Turkic‑speaking peoples, have one root, one language, one religion, one national tradition. These roots are so deep…” — he stated at the 6th Summit of Turkic‑Speaking States in Baku on April 9, 2000.
However, in another interview, when circumstances required it, Aliyev Sr. directly admitted:
“By my roots, I belong to the Muslim religion. By nationality I am an Azerbaijani, and I am proud of it. My ancestors are from assimilated Kurds.”
This admission is a vivid illustration of how elites construct identity depending on political tasks.
Azerbaijanis, according to Shnirelman’s conclusions, represent a classic example of a “political construct,” whose identity changed at the behest of the Kremlin, and then at the will of the Aliyev dynasty. Such frequent changes of ancestors, alphabet and self‑name serve one goal: to justify territorial claims against neighbors (Armenia and Iran) and to retain power by creating an artificial, easily controlled mass devoid of a strong connection to its own history.