LONDON (Realist English). In the wake of the NATO Summit’s landmark pledge to raise defence spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, attention is now turning to how that funding should be allocated — and what strategic gaps must be filled if Europe is serious about reducing its military dependence on the United States.
European NATO members are currently unable to carry out many of the key missions that only the U.S. military can perform — including suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), electronic warfare, airborne command and control, and rapid resupply in a high-intensity conflict. Defence experts argue that bridging these critical capability gaps should now be the top priority for the alliance.
The summit’s spending commitment was motivated by two factors: the growing threat from Russia and the need to keep a transactional U.S. administration — led by President Donald Trump — engaged in the alliance. But the deeper political shift in Washington has laid bare a fundamental vulnerability: NATO’s core security guarantee is no longer beyond question.
Shattered assumptions
Since returning to office, Trump has reversed the U.S. position on Ukraine, pressured Kyiv to make concessions, and adopted conciliatory rhetoric towards Moscow. His refusal to rule out military action against Denmark over Greenland — and remarks about absorbing Canada — have alarmed European leaders and weakened faith in U.S. security guarantees.
While the 3.5% pledge appears to have secured a public recommitment from Trump to NATO’s Article V, analysts warn the damage cannot be undone by funding alone. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance have made clear that the U.S. cannot sustain the burden of defending Europe while simultaneously deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. As a result, far greater European strategic autonomy is no longer optional — it’s urgent.
Replacing U.S. systems — a nuanced approach
Calls are growing across the political spectrum in many NATO countries to end reliance on American weapons. But experts caution that a wholesale shift away from U.S. platforms is unrealistic in the near term. The F-35 fighter jet remains a flashpoint in these debates, with fears — largely unfounded — of a U.S. “kill switch” disabling the aircraft. Still, genuine dependencies remain: spare parts, software updates, and mission data all flow through U.S. systems.
Critics argue that abandoning existing contracts could trigger retaliation from the Trump administration. Moreover, no European alternatives exist for several key U.S. systems, and developing them will take time even with increased funding.
Instead, experts say the focus should be on capabilities, not flags: prioritising areas where the U.S. currently provides the backbone of NATO’s defensive response — particularly in the face of a Russian attack.
Crisis-response mindset
In the event of a U.S. conflict with China, American resources would be drawn to the Indo-Pacific, potentially leaving Europe exposed. European allies must therefore be prepared to repel a Russian assault largely on their own.
Where capable European systems exist, governments should invest in them now. Where they do not — particularly for missions like SEAD/DEAD — procurement of U.S. assets such as the F-35 should continue, but with a clear-eyed understanding of operational risks and timelines.
Longer-term, projects like the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) and Future Combat Air System (FCAS) have gained strategic importance, not only for sovereignty but because higher defence budgets now make them viable.
Bottom line
Europe’s military autonomy depends not on symbolic gestures but on urgent, practical investment in the tools of modern warfare. That means closing the gaps that matter most — and doing it fast.
