LONDON (Realist English). A little-known but predictable consequence of the US and Israeli war against Iran will be mass famine in the world’s poorest regions. As Adam Hanieh, a professor at the University of London’s SOAS, writes in a column for the Financial Times, modern agriculture’s dependence on fossil fuels and the key role of the Gulf states in fertilizer production and logistics are turning a local conflict into a global food catastrophe.
“Hunger and even famine are foreseeable consequences of the war in Iran,” Hanieh notes. “Now the world must act to shield the poorest from effects that will continue long after the fighting stops.”
The oil-fuelled ‘Green Revolution’: how hydrocarbons became the basis of food
Since the Green Revolution of the mid-20th century, increased yields of wheat and rice have been inextricably linked to fossil fuels. Mechanisation, irrigation and, above all, synthetic fertilisers (especially nitrogen-based ones such as urea and ammonium nitrate) require huge volumes of natural gas. Fertiliser and transport prices directly follow oil quotes.
In March 2026, according to the World Bank, the energy price index surged 41.6% (European gas +59.4%, Brent crude +45.8%). In the same month, food rose by 2.7% and fertilisers by 26.2%. The FAO warns that if the crisis continues, global fertiliser prices could rise another 15–20% in the first half of 2026.
The role of the Gulf: not just oil, but fertilisers
The author emphasises that the current crisis differs from the shocks of 2008 and 2022 in the depth of the Gulf states’ integration into the global food system. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are now not just hydrocarbon exporters but key players in chemical and logistics chains.
Ammonia (the basis of nitrogen fertilisers): about 70% of global ammonia goes to fertiliser, and almost 30% of global exports come from the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is the world’s second-largest ammonia exporter, Oman the sixth. Together with Qatar, they cover more than three-quarters of India’s ammonia imports and 30% of Morocco’s.
Sulphur: about half of the world’s seaborne sulphur exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. The largest producers are the state-owned companies of Abu Dhabi (Adnoc), Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Morocco is the world’s largest importer of sulphur (three-quarters of supplies in 2024 came from the Gulf).
Urea: Gulf states account for 35% of global urea trade. In 2024, Saudi Arabia became the largest urea exporter, with Oman ranking third.
Phosphate fertilisers (MAP/DAP): countries north of the Strait of Hormuz provided 18% of global trade in 2024.
Egypt and Fertiglobe: control across borders
The example of Egypt, the world’s second-largest urea exporter, shows how Gulf investments lock in influence. Control over a significant share of Egypt’s nitrogen capacity belongs to Fertiglobe, in which Adnoc (UAE) now holds a controlling stake. The largest Egyptian producer, MOPCO, is 44% owned by Saudi and UAE investment funds.
Logistics hubs: Jebel Ali and Khalifa
Dubai’s Jebel Ali port, operated by state-owned DP World, is the world’s largest man‑made harbour, connected to 150 ports by 80 weekly services. According to Lloyd’s List 2025 ranking, it ranks ninth globally in container throughput. It is the main distribution hub for food destined for East Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. A significant portion of humanitarian aid also passes through it (45,000 tonnes of flour in 2024). Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa Port recently signed a 50‑year contract to build a grain terminal, further tying logistics to strategic food supplies.
Impact on the poorest countries: Sudan, Somalia, Sri Lanka
The hardest hit will not be the West. According to a March assessment by UNCTAD, Sudan imported 54% of its seaborne fertilisers from the Gulf region – the highest share in the world. It is followed by Sri Lanka (36%), Tanzania (31%), Somalia (30%), Kenya (26%) and Mozambique (22%). These countries lack the fiscal capacity to subsidise farmers or populations in the event of a sharp price spike.
Sudan is now in its third year of civil war: more than 19 million people (40% of the population) are suffering from acute hunger, and every third person has been displaced. Humanitarian operations depend on Dubai’s International Humanitarian City, but due to the war, aid routes have had to be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding three weeks and enormous costs.
Debt crisis exacerbates the situation
Developing countries are already carrying a record debt burden. In 2024, interest payments on external debt reached $921 billion. The number of countries that spend more on debt servicing than they receive in new loans has doubled over the past decade. 3.4 billion people live in countries where interest payments exceed spending on health or education. Rising rates due to inflation and investor flight to the dollar will only make things worse.
What is to be done? Moving away from the hydrocarbon model of agriculture
Hanieh calls for systemic changes: crop rotation instead of monocultures, the use of natural fertilisers, and agroecological practices. But immediate priorities are an end to the war, increased humanitarian aid, unconditional debt relief and emergency financing for the poorest countries.
“Famine and widening food insecurity are the foreseeable consequences of military aggression in the Gulf,” the expert concludes. “That reality ought to weigh heavily on a world that has largely understood this war through the narrow lens of oil-price instability.”
The world at a record hunger threshold
By the beginning of 2026, the number of people experiencing acute food insecurity worldwide had already reached a historic high of 319 million. However, the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East at the end of February and the resulting destabilisation of global logistics and fertiliser markets threaten to push millions more to the brink of hunger.
Shock from the war in Iran. The Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP) called the impact of the war on food security a “massive global consequence”. According to WFP estimates, if the conflict continues until the middle of 2026, it could push an additional 45 million people into acute hunger, and the total number of starving people could reach a record 363 million. The key reasons are the disruption of fertiliser supplies through the Strait of Hormuz and the sharp spike in fuel and transport costs.
Fertiliser crisis. Up to 30% of the world’s seaborne fertiliser trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, which is at the epicentre of the conflict – about 16 million tonnes of nitrogen, phosphate and sulphur fertilisers per year. Since the beginning of the war, fertiliser prices have soared more than 30%. In March 2026, urea prices (a key nitrogen fertiliser) jumped nearly 46% compared to the previous month. This is a direct path to reduced planting areas and future harvests.
Logistics collapse. Suppliers are avoiding the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, routing ships around Africa, which adds 25‑30 days to delivery times and increases tariffs by 15‑25%. For example, the route for humanitarian aid to Afghanistan had to be extended through 8 countries, increasing the cost of each tonne of cargo by €1000.
Africa remains the most vulnerable continent, with more than 87 million people already facing hunger in East and Southern Africa, and in West and Central Africa their number is expected to reach 52 million by mid‑2026. The war in Iran has hit Asia especially hard, where dependence on imported food and fuel is very high. According to UN forecasts, another 9.1 million people in Asia could fall into acute hunger due to the economic pressure caused by the conflict.
