DUBAI (Realist English). Negotiations between the US and Iran, resumed after the military conflict, have again reached a dead end. Despite an exchange of proposals through intermediaries, the sides cannot overcome fundamental disagreements that make a sustainable agreement virtually impossible.
Failure in Islamabad
In April 2026, Islamabad hosted the highest-level direct contact between Washington and Tehran since 1979. The talks lasted more than 21 hours but ended without result. US Vice President JD Vance said Washington had presented a “final and best offer,” but it did not receive support. The Iranian side, in turn, pointed to “excessive demands” by the US that prevented the development of a common basis for agreement.
The nuclear issue: a red line for both sides
The key disagreement concerns the nuclear program. The US demands from Iran not just a promise not to create nuclear weapons, but a “positive commitment” not to seek to possess them and not to develop tools that would allow it to obtain them quickly. In practice, this means renouncing uranium enrichment.
Tehran insists on its right to enrichment for peaceful purposes, citing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Iranian Foreign Ministry emphasized that the nuclear issue should not be a subject of negotiations on ending the war at all, and that Iran’s rights “are not a subject of bargaining.”
The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s leverage
The second critical node is control over the Strait of Hormuz. After the conflict began, Iran blocked the strait, causing disruptions in the global energy market. The US demanded free passage of vessels and in response imposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports. Iran refused to accept the American “joint control” plan, insisting on maintaining sovereignty over the strait.
For Tehran, control over the strait is the main military and strategic leverage that allowed it to withstand pressure and bring Washington back to the negotiating table. Giving it up would deprive Iran of a key instrument of influence.
Five preconditions
In May 2026, Iran outlined five conditions for resuming negotiations: an end to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon; the lifting of sanctions; the unfreezing of Iranian assets; compensation for war damage; and recognition of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. These demands were called “minimum confidence guarantees.”
The US, in turn, proposed suspending some sanctions during negotiations, but Iran insists on the complete lifting of restrictions as part of any final agreement.
Crisis of trust
The fundamental problem is the lack of trust. Iran remembers how the US withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal and then twice — in 2025 and 2026 — carried out military strikes on Iranian facilities, including during negotiations. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that it was the US that “repeatedly obstructed the diplomatic process, violating agreements and using force.”
On the American side, skepticism also persists regarding Tehran’s willingness to fulfill obligations. Analysts describe the situation as a “structural problem of commitments”: neither side can provide reliable guarantees of compliance with agreements.
US-Iran negotiations are failing not because of a lack of dialogue but because of a lack of conditions for it. The nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz are not technical details but fundamental questions of sovereignty and security on which the sides hold mutually exclusive positions. Sanctions and military pressure, instead of forcing Iran to make concessions, have strengthened its determination to resist.
As long as Washington demands renunciation of enrichment and Tehran insists on its right, as long as the US maintains the blockade and Iran maintains control over the strait, no agreement is possible. Even temporary arrangements will be fragile, since trust is destroyed and there are no mechanisms for verification and guarantees. Negotiations continue through intermediaries — Pakistan, Oman, Qatar — but without a change in basic positions, they will remain merely crisis management rather than resolution.
