WASHINGTON (Realist English). The ceasefire between the United States and Iran, formalised by the June 17 memorandum, is not a victory for Washington but a classic stalemate, in which neither side has achieved its maximalist goals. This view was expressed in his article for Foreign Affairs by Hussein Banai, Associate Professor of International Studies at Indiana University and co‑author of Republics of Myth: National Narratives and the U.S.-Iran Conflict.
According to the expert, Donald Trump, when he launched the war against Iran in late February, promised Americans the complete elimination of Iran’s nuclear programme, missile capabilities and even the Islamic regime itself. “He failed on every count,” Banai writes. The war showed that Tehran proved more resilient than expected: the regime withstood months of strikes, including the assassination of almost its entire top leadership, and survived. Moreover, Iran demonstrated that it could shut down the Strait of Hormuz and drive up energy prices, which ultimately prompted Trump to end the conflict.
However, the author stresses that this is not necessarily a defeat for the United States. Washington achieved some tactical successes and conceded relatively little. On the whole, the deal returns the sides to the pre‑war status quo. Yes, US officials will still have to manage Iran’s nuclear ambitions, missiles and proxy forces, but the United States has done so for 20 years without full‑scale war.
Why Trump overestimated his capabilities
Banai reminds that from the very start of the bombings, the US put itself in a difficult position by defining victory in maximalist terms. Trump promised not only to eliminate the nuclear programme, but also to “destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground,” “annihilate” Iran’s navy, and “ensure that the regime’s terrorist proxies can no longer destabilise the region.” He called on Iranians to take to the streets and overthrow the government.
None of this was achieved. The US and Israel quickly killed almost all of Iran’s top officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but Tehran swiftly replaced them and continued fighting. Iran intensified missile strikes on US bases, on the oil and gas infrastructure of neighbouring Arab countries, and on targets in Israel. Most importantly, the Iranians realised they could close the Strait of Hormuz, creating a global energy crisis.
In the end, Trump had to bow to reality and agree to a ceasefire. Washington tried to tighten the blockade, but US intelligence concluded that the regime could hold out indefinitely. The administration faced a choice: either continue the war with no guarantee of victory, or accept a deal that would reopen the strait.
Iran also claims victory
Tehran, for its part, has every reason to consider itself a winner. The regime survived weeks of bombing by two more powerful opponents, retained hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium and the capacity to enrich more. Most importantly, it showed it could dominate the world’s most important oil thoroughfare. Even despite the deteriorating economic and infrastructure situation inside the country, Iran’s geopolitical hand has been strengthened. Control over the strait has become a powerful bargaining chip in nuclear negotiations and a guarantee against new US attacks.
Stalemate: how to manage conflict without war
In Banai’s view, the Islamic regime has honed the art of stalemate for decades. For nearly 50 years, it has existed in a state of unending competition with Washington, learning to tolerate significant pressure. For Tehran, it is optimal to maintain an unpleasant equilibrium: too little progress (to avoid compromising its revolutionary identity) and too little tension (to avoid provoking an invasion). The US, by contrast, has always felt uncomfortable in such conditions.
This asymmetry makes the stalemate much harder for Washington to accept than for Tehran. The US cannot tolerate Iran’s regional dominance, but war, as the last few months have shown, is not the right way to stop it. The expert suggests using more targeted instruments: on missiles and proxies, rely on regional allies – Israel and the Gulf monarchies.
Israel can maintain credible deterrence, and the Gulf states can harden their air defences while simultaneously seeking a long‑term strategic accommodation with Tehran. The US, in turn, can bolster military assistance to these partners as part of a containment strategy.
The nuclear programme and Israel’s role
On the nuclear issue, the US cannot fully rely on allies, but it has other tools. Iran may never agree to give up enrichment entirely, but it has an incentive to strike a deal that imposes meaningful limits in exchange for sanctions relief. Such an agreement may face resistance from hardliners, but pragmatic forces in Tehran could present it as a concession wrung from Washington.
The Gulf states, having suffered from Iranian attacks and the consequences of the strait’s closure, are likely to support a deal. But Israel, which sees Iran as an existential threat, will oppose it. Israeli forces, for example, struck Beirut on June 14, just as Tehran and Washington were finalising the agreement. Iran was preparing to retaliate, but US diplomats promised to force Israel to stop attacks on Hezbollah, allowing the deal to be completed. In the future, Washington should expect further Israeli attempts to scupper the agreement, perhaps through direct strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
To prevent this, the US will have to use leverage over its ally: suspend arms sales, limit intelligence assistance and diplomatic protection, while offering Israel security guarantees so that it does not feel compelled to strike first.
Accepting reality
In Banai’s view, many US foreign policy elites refuse to admit that Iran cannot be defeated, and view the current pause merely as an interlude before a decisive victory. Yet the reality is that Iran has shown it can withstand extreme pressure and inflict serious damage on the US, even when its offensive capabilities are badly degraded. The current administration lacks the strategic vision and discipline for a protracted ground invasion. Renewed conflict would only burn through US munitions, trigger global inflation and exhaust the patience of allies.
“It is time for the United States to acknowledge the truth: it is caught in a stalemate,” Banai writes. “It should stop musing about how to conclusively defeat Iran and start figuring out how to peacefully manage a tricky, confrontational relationship. Such work is hardly glamorous; draws never are. But it is the only way Washington can actually keep Tehran in check and preserve U.S. power in the Middle East.”
