TEHRAN (Realist English). Months after taking office as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei is beginning to shape his own military-political course.
In a series of appointments, he has effectively reorganised the country’s top military command, restructuring the institutions responsible for managing war and diplomacy.
As Sina Toossi, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, writes in his article for Foreign Policy, these changes reveal Tehran’s strategy for the coming years: centralisation of command, an emphasis on offensive operations and preparation for a protracted confrontation with the US and Israel.
From defence to offence: the new deterrence doctrine
The new command structure points to a fundamental shift in Tehran’s approach to conflict: more centralised military command, greater emphasis on offensive operations and inflicting more serious damage on the enemy to strengthen deterrence, as well as closer integration of military, economic, diplomatic and internal security policy.
As Toossi notes, these appointments do not mean Tehran is abandoning negotiations. On the contrary, Iran is trying to combine diplomacy with a tougher deterrence concept, seeking to preserve and strengthen its ability to inflict damage on the enemy so that negotiations lead to a lasting settlement rather than another pause before hostilities resume.
Key appointments: from Rezaei to Taeb
The new approach found its clearest expression in the appointment of Mohsen Rezaei as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council – the body coordinating military, diplomatic, economic and security policy. Rezaei is a former IRGC commander who, in 1988, when Iran’s military position was deteriorating, advocated continuing the war with Iraq, proposing a five‑year military build‑up plan.
His appointment, in Toossi’s view, points to a “higher threshold for compromise” and a conviction that Iran should not end the conflict without having accumulated sufficient military strength and leverage to shape the final settlement.
Other key appointments:
- Ali Abdollahi, the new Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, has been tasked with completing the integration of the Khatam al‑Anbiya central headquarters into the General Staff structure – a reorganisation that will further centralise military command.
- Ahmad Vahidi, formally confirmed as IRGC Commander‑in‑Chief, has been instructed to pursue “maximum deterrence” while maintaining readiness for “powerful offensive operations against the enemy.” Iranian commentators note that this is an unusually explicit reference to offensive operations in the IRGC commander’s mandate.
- Ali Azmai, the new IRGC Navy Commander, takes office at a time when control over the Strait of Hormuz has become Iran’s most significant lever of pressure on Washington and the global economy.
- Hossein Taeb has been returned to the post of Basij commander with a mandate to strengthen the “public intelligence network,” use new technologies and deepen the organisation at the neighbourhood level.
The common thread in these appointments is a vision of conflict that extends far beyond the battlefield. Naval influence, internal surveillance and mobilisation, economic resilience and military power are increasingly seen as deeply interconnected elements of Iran’s ability to withstand pressure and deter attempts at military defeat.
Lessons of war: why Iran is changing strategy
The new strategy reflects a reassessment of why deterrence failed before the war. After the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, Tehran largely adhered to “strategic patience,” calibrating its responses to sanctions and attacks in an effort to avoid a wider conflict. Now, the prevailing view in Tehran is that this restraint backfired, reinforcing perceptions in Washington and Israel of Iran as a weak and vulnerable target.
The lesson drawn from the wars since June 2025 is not simply that Iran needs more powerful military capabilities, but that it must demonstrate a willingness to use them to inflict enough damage to deter adversaries from escalating again.
The Strait of Hormuz and economic security
Economic security has become part of this calculus. Influential figures, such as parliamentary speaker’s economic adviser Majid Shakeri, argue that the war must end on terms that give Iran a viable economic future. However, the experience of the nuclear deal and the recent memorandum has reinforced doubts that sanctions relief dependent on US permissions can provide such a future.
This helps explain why Iran places such importance on maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz: Tehran is seeking leverage it controls itself, making the resumption of economic pressure more costly and, ultimately, tying its security and prosperity to the security of the Gulf states and the global economy.
Khamenei’s appointments, in Toossi’s view, indicate that he is institutionalising this broader strategy, building a state ready for negotiations while simultaneously strengthening its ability to endure a protracted conflict and raise costs in the event that talks fail.
“The goal is ultimately to convince Iran’s adversaries that achieving a lasting settlement with the Islamic Republic will be cheaper than continuing the war or making another attempt to impose their preferred outcome by military force,” Toossi concludes.
Sina Toossi is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy (Washington, DC) and a specialist on US‑Iran relations.
