BRASÍLIA (Realist English). Judging by the recent presidential elections in Latin American countries, Donald Trump has no intention of abandoning his course to bring the region back under US political protectorate, which implies the ousting of China and Russia.
Moreover, as shown by the processes unfolding in Venezuela and the transfer of ownership of the Panama Canal terminals to Americans (the canal itself belongs to the state of Panama), Beijing’s multibillion‑dollar investments in these countries’ economies did not become an obstacle to the expulsion of Chinese businesses.
According to Cuban journalists, business circles linked to allies of the fallen Maduro regime have now been forced out of Venezuela. This applies not only to China. At the same time, there are fears that in the event of Trump’s invasion of Cuba, the same scheme awaits the Island of Freedom.
As for the return of Chinese investments sunk in Venezuela, no real progress has been made so far, although Beijing discussed the issue with Trump during his visit.
Venezuela: From Anti‑Americanism to Direct Control
The current de facto head of Venezuela, Delcy Rodríguez, now does not even give interviews without consulting Trump. Recently, the US press revealed a very curious episode of Trump’s relations with the Venezuelan authorities. When Fox News journalist Bret Baier requested an interview with acting President Delcy Rodríguez, she replied that she must first obtain Donald Trump’s approval.
Several US outlets commented ironically on the situation, noting that it is amusing to watch how a once anti‑American politician has demonstrated that Venezuela is in practice under direct external US control and acts on instructions from the Oval Office.
Chinese Anxieties: Investments Do Not Guarantee Loyalty
Chinese analysts are watching with alarm the trend that, as it turns out, investment does not guarantee control over a region. In private conversations, they express fears that post‑Soviet countries might also fail to appreciate Beijing’s “goodwill gestures.” Specifically, in the context of geopolitical competition for Central Asia, accepting and absorbing investments is no guarantee that a country will choose China as its geopolitical priority.
For example, Beijing is extremely wary of the new wave of Turkish activism and, more broadly, the Turanian factor in the post‑Soviet space. And the case of stranded Chinese investments in distant Latin America is being discussed in the corridors of power in Beijing. As is well known, bad examples are contagious.
Colombia: An Ultra‑Right President with Trump’s Backing
Trump, unlike Xi, has set a course to oust left‑wing presidents and facilitate the rise of far‑right politicians, as happened in late May in Colombia. He is guided by the well‑known maxim: “Gold said, ‘I buy everything.’ Steel said, ‘I take everything.'” Moreover, Trump does this quite openly, without fear of accusations of interfering in the internal affairs of foreign states — or rather, by ignoring those accusations. And indeed, why should he be shy after abducting the president of Venezuela right from his palace and issuing incessant threats of military invasion against Cuba? The USSR with its power and extensive presence in Latin America is long gone. And modern Russia, alas, is no match for the US in this region. The struggle is between Beijing and Washington.
As for Colombia, in the first round (May 31 of this year), the ultra‑right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella (also called “El Tigre”) won with about 43.7% of the vote and advanced to the second round, where he faced Iván Cepeda, the candidate of the left‑wing coalition “Historic Pact,” which was linked to the then‑president and friend of Russia, Gustavo Petro.
Trump posted on his Truth Social network in early June, declaring his “full and unconditional support” for de la Espriella. Trump called the politician a “smart, strong, and tough leader” who would “stop illegal immigration and restore order.” He described his opponent, Iván Cepeda, as a “radical left‑wing Marxist” and stressed that the election results were important for US‑Colombia relations. Later, after de la Espriella’s victory in the second round (June 21), Trump again personally congratulated him on social media.
Gustavo Petro called Trump’s words a crude interference in the country’s internal affairs and called on citizens to vote freely so as not to “become slaves or a colony of anyone.” Opponents pointed out that this was not the first time Trump had publicly endorsed foreign politicians and criticised such interference. At the same time, de la Espriella thanked the US president for his support and stressed that under him, relations between the two countries would become closer, including in the fight against drug trafficking.
Trump’s efforts in Colombia fell on fertile ground. The traditional political elite of the country (including the military) and the owners of large businesses, belonging to the so‑called “chosen” category, as a rule, were educated in the United States and are oriented towards developing ties with that country. The left, in a relatively short period of rule, was unable to radically change the situation in Colombia.
Why Colombia Matters So Much to Trump
What makes this country so important to Trump, apart from its geopolitical significance? Diplomatic ties between the two countries were established back in 1822 — immediately after Colombia gained independence from Spain. And all this time, Colombia was (before the brief rise of the left) one of the main US outposts in the region.
In 2022, under Joe Biden, Colombia received the status of a major non‑NATO ally, and cooperation further strengthened, including in migration and trade. In 2012, the Free Trade Agreement (CTPA) entered into force. It reduced trade barriers: eliminated tariffs on most exports, affected investment, telecommunications, intellectual property, as well as labour and environmental issues.
For a long time, especially under right‑wing leaders, Colombia was one of the key US partners in the region. A striking example is “Plan Colombia” (since 2000): the parties “jointly fought drug cartels and insurgent groups” (FARC, ELN). The US supplied military aid (helicopters, special forces training) — in total more than $10 billion.
The Trump administration criticised the Colombian authorities during the left‑wing president’s tenure for “insufficient efforts to combat drug trafficking.” In October 2025, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on Petro himself and the Minister of the Interior, citing their involvement in drug trafficking. In Bogotá, this was seen as politically motivated and an infringement on sovereignty. Trump threatened and partially implemented restrictions: suspended financial aid and announced higher tariffs on Colombian imports.
Other steps also affected relations: Colombia’s accession to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Washington saw this as a threat to its influence), as well as Petro’s public statements criticising US policies.
Chinese Investments in Colombia: $800 Million and Elite Discontent
Less is written about Chinese investment presence in Colombia than about Beijing’s multibillion‑dollar investments in, say, Brazil. But in reality, during the short period of left‑wing rule, the total volume of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Colombia exceeded $800 million. Above all, these are logistics projects: Autopista al Mar 2 (254 km, connecting Medellín with the Caribbean coast), the first line of the Bogotá Metro.
We should also note investment in energy, coffee, or quinoa production. China’s activity in Colombia provoked sharp discontent not only from the US but also from the local elite oriented towards Washington. Above all, they expressed fears that the country would fall into debt dependence on China.
Drug Trafficking: Business and a Lever of Pressure for Washington
The topic of the fight against drugs, which Trump actively uses in political bargaining with Mexico’s leadership, in Washington’s execution resembles a merciless fight against crime the least — especially in Colombia. Incidentally, the Mexican president, in order to prevent a US armed invasion of her country under the pretext of combating drug cartels, had to agree to virtually unimpeded FBI operations on Mexican territory. As practice shows, “Hoover’s boys” use the opportunities provided to them not only to purge drug cartels that are displeasing to Trump, while “ignoring those” that are protected by high‑level offices in Washington, but also to hunt down Russian businesses that have “dared” to do business in Mexico.
Colombia long ago ceded the lead in processing harmless coca into deadly cocaine to Mexico. And this did not happen without the “help” of US “drug kingpins.” All the main chemical laboratories for cocaine production are located precisely in Mexico. And have been for a long time. And the profits flow to offshore banks in Panama, and not only there. But the owners of these accounts should be sought not in the capitals of Latin America, but in the corridors of power and luxurious offices of business companies in Washington.
Colombia itself has long been the main supplier of raw materials for cocaine production. It was with the arrival of Europeans, especially in the early years of the 20th century, that the derivative of coca — cocaine — appeared in a different guise. As the renowned researcher Miguel Palacio writes, “cocaine became known as a narcotic substance whose consumption invariably entails the emergence of an irresistible addiction and severe impairment of bodily functions. Cocaine has taken its special place among the woes and tragedies brought to humanity by the 20th century.”
For decades, the drug business has been a huge system embedded in a number of Latin American countries, including Colombia, at all levels of government. It has much greater resources and often influence in all spheres of life than the official authorities. And the security forces are no exception here. This is one of the most profitable types of business, far more profitable than selling oil. And Trump, as a major businessman devoid of illusions, cannot fail to understand this.
Let us recall the history of the elimination of Escobar in Colombia, when US security forces simply cleared the way for another drug cartel. The US then used the “Cali Cartel” to eliminate the Medellín Cartel, led by Pablo Escobar. And later, the Cali Cartel as well. For decades, drug trafficking in Colombia has been under the control of illegal armed groups, while its export from the country has been under the control of US military bases.
Note that currently US military personnel use the infrastructure of the Colombian armed forces, not military bases under Pentagon control. And mainly within the framework of “Plan Colombia” — an assistance programme to combat drug trafficking and insurgent groups.
Some politicians and activists in Colombia and other Latin American countries express concern that such a presence goes beyond the stated anti‑terrorist and anti‑drug agenda and serves broader US geopolitical goals. But with the advent of a right‑wing president, the presence of the US military contingent may even increase. I have no doubt that the topic of drug trafficking for Trump is, above all, business and an opportunity to expand military presence.
Brazil — The Main Battle: How Will China Respond?
So, unlike China, Trump is betting not only and not so much on investment presence in Latin American countries. Although since 2024, when China’s investments in Colombia dropped significantly, Washington maintains its position as one of the leading economic partners of the country. According to statistics, in 2024, the inflow of US foreign direct investment (FDI) into Colombia was the largest compared with other investor countries. Overall, the US accounts for a substantial share of total FDI inflows into the country.
US investors are active in several areas: information and communication technology (ICT), mining, transport, and energy.
Gradually but purposefully, Trump, by installing US‑oriented presidents, is pushing China out of the region, while the invested investments are already a matter of separate negotiations — and not always convenient for China.
There are three months left before the elections in Brazil. Recall that this is China’s key investment destination in the region. If the country’s president, the popular left‑wing politician Lula, fails to win this time, China risks not only losing multibillion‑dollar investments but also the countries of Latin America returning to the status of the United States’ “backyard.”
Tatiana Poloskova — Doctor of Political Sciences, First Class State Counsellor of the Russian Federation, specially for Realist English
