WASHINGTON (Realist English). Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, Rachel Metz, argues in her article for Foreign Affairs that the US war with Iran was made possible primarily by a network of overt and covert military bases across the Middle East.
It is this “empire of access,” rather than just military superiority, that allows America to strike thousands of miles from its shores. However, the author warns, host countries pay for this with their own security, and in the future they may deny Washington access, which would put an end to American military hegemony.
The “Empire of Access” as the Foundation of Global Power
Since the end of World War II, the United States has fought wars around the world — from Korea and Vietnam to Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Iran. Theoretically, projecting power over thousands of miles is extremely difficult: weapons have limited range and supply lines are stretched.
Yet the US has overcome these barriers by creating an extensive network of military bases and, more importantly, by securing “wartime access” — permission from foreign states to use their territory for transit, refueling, and launching strikes.
“Wartime access makes every country in the world — no matter how far from American shores — the United States’ next-door neighbor,” Metz writes.
During the war with Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, this mechanism worked at full capacity. The US moved hundreds of aircraft via an “airbridge” from bases in the US and Europe to the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, from where they were dispersed to bases in Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
The aircraft carriers USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald Ford operated in the Arabian Sea, replenishing supplies in the ports of regional countries, while the fire-damaged Ford left for repairs at the Greek base of Souda Bay. Thousands of Marines and Army units were deployed to undisclosed locations in the region.
The Price of Access: Host Countries Become Targets
The downside of access has been vulnerability. From the first days of the war, Iran fired more than 5,000 missiles and drones at facilities in countries that provided bases. The strikes hit:
- Saudi Arabia: Prince Sultan Air Base.
- Kuwait: Ali Al Salem Air Base and Camp Buehring, and on June 3, 2026, the main international airport in Kuwait (put out of commission).
- Qatar: Al Udeid Air Base.
- Bahrain: the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet, as well as desalination plants.
- UAE: Al Dhafra Air Base (one of the first targets), where nearly 3,000 Iranian strikes were intercepted, but damage was still inflicted.
Despite the strikes, the UAE joined the US and Israel in launching retaliatory strikes against Iran.
Precedents of Denial and the Future of Access
Not all allies agreed. Spain categorically denied access to the bases at Rota and Morón at the start of the campaign, and in late March closed its airspace to the US military. France, according to Trump, did the same. Italy denied landing rights to several US bombers at Sigonella base.
Turkey only allowed the deployment of Patriot air defense systems and AWACS aircraft to protect its airspace, publicly denying permission for combat sorties from Incirlik Air Base. Pakistan closed ground supply lines during the war in Afghanistan, and Switzerland initially denied overflight requests.
The author notes that until now, host countries could be confident in US protection. But the proliferation of cheap drones and missiles, which are difficult to intercept even with powerful air defenses, is changing the equation.
In the future, potential partners (such as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea in a hypothetical conflict with China) may decide that the risk of retaliation is too great.
The End of Hegemony?
If states begin to deny the US military access on a mass scale, Washington’s ability to project power around the world will sharply decline. The “empire of bases” could collapse. However, Metz concludes, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Higher costs for starting a war could deter Washington from ill-advised military adventures.
