WASHINGTON (Realist English). The Pew Research Center forecast that Islam will become the world’s largest religion by 2035 is based on a number of assumptions that demographers question. Although the center’s methodology itself is considered professional, long-term extrapolations over 50 years do not account for factors capable of radically changing the picture.

The Definition Problem: Who Is Counted as a Muslim

The key methodological vulnerability of Pew’s forecasts relates to how the center defines religious affiliation. Demographer Hervé Le Bras, a professor at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris, pointed out that Pew effectively equates a “Muslim” with a “person from a Muslim country,” ignoring personal religiosity.

In his own study with a sample of more than 50,000 respondents in France, only 3% identified themselves as Muslims, of whom only a third were practicing — that is, about 500,000 people, rather than the 5.7 million Pew counted.

“In the US, when they talk about Muslims, they mean people from Muslim countries. But even that doesn’t work,” Le Bras noted.

Ignoring Secularization in the Muslim World

In its forecasts, Pew assumes a static preservation of religious affiliation, not allowing for the possibility of mass abandonment of religion. Meanwhile, research records a rise in non-religiosity even in traditionally Muslim societies. According to a survey published in 2019, in the Arab world the share of people calling themselves “non-religious” grew from 11% to 18% over five years. In Iran, where official statistics call 99.5% of the population Muslim, studies show that only about 40% identify themselves as Muslims.

Critics also point out that Pew underestimates the impact of education and urbanization on fertility. Data from India demonstrate a steady decline in fertility among Muslim women: from 4.4 children per woman in 1992 to 2.36 in 2019–2021 — the rate of decline outpaces the corresponding figures among Hindus.

Fertility as an Unstable Variable

Pew’s forecast is built on a fertility rate of 3.1 children per Muslim woman in 2020–2025. However, demographers note that the fertility of migrants and their descendants tends to decline to the level of the host society. Danish religious scholar Brian Arly Jacobsen of the University of Copenhagen cited an example: among immigrant women from non-European countries in Denmark, fertility fell from 3.41 children in 1993 to 2.11 in 2016 — almost to the national level.

“All the premises of the forecast are variable. This concerns fluctuations in fertility, migration flows, and life expectancy,” Jacobsen noted, adding that Pew’s estimates “are at the upper bound” of what is possible.

Climate Factor and Regional Constraints

A separate line of criticism relates to climate risks. Political scientist Leyla Zahirova of Concordia University (US) in her research questions Pew’s demographic forecast, pointing out that climate change may limit population growth in Muslim countries. Droughts, crop failures, and extreme heat could lead to a decline rather than growth in the regions where the bulk of Muslim population growth is concentrated.

Pew’s Own Position: “This Is Not a Clash”

Pew Research Center has distanced itself from political interpretations of its data. Director of Religious Research Alan Cooperman emphasized that the growth of Muslim and Christian populations occurs predominantly in countries where these groups already constitute a majority, and conversion plays a minor role.

“I don’t think this is a situation in which the growth of Muslims comes at the expense of Christians. What worries me is that headlines could present this as a kind of clash,” Cooperman stated.

Pew itself acknowledges that its forecasts decades ahead are not a prediction but represent an extrapolation of current trends provided they continue. Center researchers noted that they were surprised by the faster-than-expected growth in the number of non-religious people in 2010–2026 — which in itself demonstrates the limitations of long-term models.

As observers note, the key feature of the situation is the gap between statistical extrapolation and real dynamics. Pew’s forecast may remain an “option” in demographic models, but the very elaboration of 50-year scenarios creates risks of politicization and the use of numbers to stir anxiety — whereas demographic reality is shaped by factors that do not lend themselves to linear forecasting.

For public discussion, the immediate effect will be visible primarily in the extent to which media and politicians separate a “forecast under current trends” from “inevitable future” — and that is precisely where the balance between demographic analysis and political manipulation is most sensitive.