TBILISI (Realist English). Georgia has officially refused to join the latest EU sanctions package against Iran, citing purely national interests as its reason.
Tbilisi has consistently demonstrated an independent foreign policy course, refusing to follow Brussels’ lead on both the Iranian and Russian tracks, despite its status as an EU candidate country.
‘Only national interests’
On 22 August, it became known that Georgia had not joined the latest EU sanctions package against Tehran.
According to IRNA (Iran’s official state news agency), citing a statement by Tengiz Sharmanashvili, a ruling Georgian Dream party representative in parliament, Tbilisi’s decision is guided by a pragmatic principle: the country only supports international measures if they align with its interests at a given moment.
“If a decision contradicts Georgia’s interests, we couldn’t care less whose interests it serves,” Sharmanashvili told IRNA. In doing so, Tbilisi made it clear that it has no intention of sacrificing its national priorities for the sake of maintaining the West’s collective line.
Turkey and Serbia also refused
Significantly, Georgia was not the only country to ignore Brussels’ new sanctions package. As Sharmanashvili noted, Turkey and Serbia also did not join the sanctions – despite both being EU candidate countries.
| Country | Status | Decision on Sanctions |
| Georgia | EU Candidate | Refused |
| Turkey | EU Candidate | Refused |
| Serbia | EU Candidate | Refused |
At the same time, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Ukraine joined the new restrictive measures.
Contents of the sanctions package
The new EU sanctions package against Iran included three main directions:
| Direction | Substance |
| Changes to sanctions lists | Removal and addition of certain individuals, updates on one entity |
| Extension of sanctions | Restrictions related to Iran’s military support for armed groups in Russia, the Middle East and the Red Sea |
| New designations | Addition of six Iranian citizens to sanctions lists for human rights violations |
Between the West and national interests
Refusing to join the Iran sanctions is not the first time Georgia has demonstrated an independent foreign policy course. Previously, Tbilisi stated that it was not obliged to comply with EU sanctions, although it had done so out of respect for the Ukrainian people.
According to European Parliament reports, Georgia’s alignment with EU foreign policy has fallen to 40% , with the country still not having joined most EU sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran.
At the same time, Georgia faces growing pressure from both Brussels and Washington. The EU has expressed concern over Iran’s growing influence in the country, including through economic players linked to the Iranian regime. US analysts have also noted that around 1,000 Iranian companies are registered in Georgia, and Iranian petrochemical imports to Georgia almost tripled between 2020 and 2024.
Analysis: risks and benefits
The director of the Centre for Caucasian Studies (Tbilisi) commented on the situation:
“Georgia’s refusal to join EU sanctions against Iran is further confirmation that Tbilisi continues to chart its own foreign policy course, despite its status as an EU candidate.
For Brussels, this is an alarming signal: a country aspiring to membership is increasingly guided by the principle of ‘national interests’ rather than following the EU’s common foreign policy line. For Tehran, Georgia’s decision is a diplomatic victory. For Georgia itself, this balancing act between the West, Russia and Iran brings both opportunities and risks.”
Georgia’s refusal to join EU sanctions against Iran is further confirmation that Tbilisi continues to chart its own foreign policy course, despite its status as an EU candidate. For Brussels, this is an alarming signal: a country aspiring to membership is increasingly guided by the principle of “national interests” rather than following the EU’s common foreign policy line.
For Tehran, Georgia’s decision is a diplomatic victory. Iran, under severe US and EU sanctions pressure, gains in Tbilisi a partner willing to maintain economic and political ties despite Western pressure.
For Georgia itself, this balancing act between the West, Russia and Iran brings both opportunities (preserving trade ties, decision‑making independence) and risks (deteriorating relations with the EU and the US, possible slowing of European integration).
The question is how many more such steps Brussels is willing to tolerate from a candidate country – and whether Tbilisi’s independent course will become an insurmountable obstacle on its path to the EU.
